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On the Embodiment of Recursive Communication (Theory)
by Klaus Krippeildorff, University ofPennsylvania. 1995.5.16
(I)
Embodiment. 'Communication' is a word that occurs in the context ofother words and in the presence ofpeople speaking
and listening, that is, being in a particular coordination relative to each other. When the speaking ofcommunication is the
communication spoken of, we are in what Heinz von Foerster calls an "eigen behavior" at which the operand is stable under its
operation and at which its self-reference collapses into unity. But this is also a condition in which a process is embodied, here, in
those speaking and listening to each other.
Extending Humberto Maturana's proposition that speaks ofautopoietic systems as occurring in a medium, I suggest:
All reeursive processes must be carried by a medium.
The relationship between a process and its medium can be described as perturbations, emphasizing the unpredictability ofits effects,
as disturbances, emphasizing its undesirable influences, but it can also be described in terms ofwhether the medium supports (affords)
or objects to (contests, resists or vetoes) the meandering ofa process.
Formal or mathematical theories ignore the embodiment ofwhat they speak about precisely because the logic ofa medium is
incommensurate with such theories. Blaming the medium for causing breakdowns or for preventing the realiz.ation of a theory would
make no sense otherwise. Understanding (talking of or coping with) the interaction oflogically incommensurate domains is not easy.
(2)
Position. I wish to distinguish two positions from which to see, act and talk: the position ofa detached observer and the
position ofan involved participant. They roughly correlate with the distinction between outsiders and insiders to a phenomenon,
between talk from a third person perspective and talk from a first person perspeetive, between objectivity without and with
parenthesis, and between first and second-order cybernetics. They also differ in the experience ofagency. Typically, scientific
observers fail to acknowledge their taking any position.
From the position ofa detached observer. understanding communication involves a logic of composition ofknown components. each
ofwhich may have a logic ofits own. Since a logic ofcomposition is not comprehensible in terms ofthe logic ofits components -
the exception being when all these logics are the same or at least commensurate, a convenient assumption used to justify positionless
accounts ofthem - detached observers are led into superior roles and their monological constructions ofother humans are no
different from those ofmachines.
From the position ofan involved participant, understanding communication must (I) acknowledge the inaccessibility of the logic of
Others (being any one's medium) and, hence, the need to listen to a polyphony ofvoices, and (2) admit active participation in the
ensuing coordination between selfand Others. Here, (3) communication becomes an open-ended strategy for mutually informed
agents, journeying through parallel constructions ofhypothetical worlds, not one.
(3)
Constitution. Constitution is definition from within, saying something into attention, enacting it into being, and
understanding what it thereby has become. I suggest all social phenomena are constituted in the understanding oftheir participants,
communication being one ofthem.
i prefer to locate communication in what its participants bring to it. Drawing on Maturana's "Everything is said by an observer" and
Paul Watzlawick et al.'s "You cannot not communicate," I say:
Everything said Is communicated to someone understanding It as such.
This makes communication dependent on the "act ofacceptance as such" (Gabriel Stolzenberg) by someone holding a construction of
what communication is. But it says nothing about the embodiment of the process. Hence the proposition:
Human communication is constituted in the recursive unfolding or communication constructions, held by its participants
(including of each other), into coordinations they recognize and can es:plain to each other in terms of communication.
Appropriately, this proposition is silent on the nature ofparticipants' constructions (logics). It merely asserts the need for conceptions
ofcommunication to be enacted into intertwining processes as long as these processes, their explanations and contestations are not
terminated in the medium ofall Others. There is no presumption of hierarchy. None is superior to any Other. There is no need for
dual world constructions. The proposition defines communication as a recursive practice but also as a multilogical and embodied one.
However, as with all definitions, it is stated from a third person perspective. This, I want to overcome.
(4)
Otherness. One can tolerate Others' otherness, one can even celebrate Others' otherness (Edward Sampson), but I think
neither accords the respect I prefer to receive myself. To me, this respect is born in one's commitment to listen, to avoid acting on
fixed theories of Others, to open spaces for many voices to be heard, and to collaborate in maintaining the possibilities of continued
conversations. Most importantly, this entails the willingness to travel through many incommensurate logics, from my constructions
ofreality to that ofOthers and back. Increasing the recursive depth of discourse starts with seeing myself through Others eyes. The
proposition on recursive communication invites these articulations. Monological constructions ofcommunication retard them. I
suggest that such interactively evolving constructions of discourse are at the root of second-order cybernetics.
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